































The Case of the Water Framework 

















Irrigation in the Mediterranean countries is an essential requirement for agricultural 
production, while water for agriculture is used only marginally in central and northern 
European countries. There are significant pressures on water resources and aquatic 
ecosystems in Spain, Italy and Turkey because of the very large areas under irrigation, 
with a combined annual water demand close to 80,000 hm3. Irrigation development in 
these three countries has been driven by large and sustained public investments in water 
projects to store, transport and distribute water to irrigation fields. In addition, there 
have been large increases of groundwater extractions in Italy and Spain during the 
second half of the twentieth century. The escalation in groundwater extractions has been 
driven by the falling costs of pumping technologies, especially in areas with profitable 
irrigated crops. In contrast to the large collective irrigation systems, these private 
groundwater extractions are not subject to much control by the water administration.  
In Italy, pervasive aquifer overdraft and water quality problems are located in the Po 
basin, Romagna and Puglia, and in the coastal plains of Campania, Calabria and 
Sardegna. Highly profitable fruit and vegetable production, based on individual 
pumping from aquifers, takes place mainly in the Po basin and in Emilia-Romagna. In 
these regions, the problem is not so much of water scarcity, but of water quality. 
 In Spain, the most severe scarcity and quality problems occur in the Southeastern 
Iberian Peninsula. A dual situation exists for irrigation in Spain. In one case, inland 
irrigation districts are based on collective surface irrigation systems and low value 
crops, and water resources degradation is moderate. The reason is that the basin 
authorities regulate water extractions, and the aquatic ecosyste m is protected to a certain 
extent. In the second case, high-value crops, such as fruits and vegetables, are grown 
primarily in the Mediterranean coastal areas, which rely on individual pumping from the 
aquifers. There is a lack of effective control on groundwater extractions, both from the 
legal and illegal wells, and on the volumes of water extracted. Decades of 
mismanagement of water in these areas have resulted in severe scarcity and degradation 
of water resources. 
There are two general policy approaches when dealing with quantity and quality 
problems faced by the Mediterranean irrigated agriculture. One is the traditional water 
policy based on the continuous expansion of water supply, and the other is a 
comparatively new approach based on water demand m anagement initiatives. These 
emerging initiatives rely on measures such water pricing, revision of water rights, 
abstraction limits on surface and groundwater, development of regulated water markets, 
and water resources reuse and recycling. 
A good illustrative example of the conflict between these two approaches is the type 
of solutions that have been considered for solving water scarcity and degradation in 
Southeastern Spain. Two projects have been proposed in the last four years: the Ebro 
interbasin transfer and the new AGUA project designed to replace the Ebro transfer. 
Both projects rely on the traditional approach of expanding supply with subsidized 
public investments, and both are questionable on economic grounds.   1
However, measures based on the new approach of water demand management 
initiatives require careful application and a reliable information base, since 
implementation of these measures is a complex process that meets with resistance from 
farmers. Banning aquifer overdraft is very difficult to achieve, since aquifers are a 
common resource, and thus pose significant managerial challenges. Water pricing is 
also difficult to implement because of farmers’ opposition to price increases, lack of 
administrative control on aquifer pumping costs, and non-response of water demand to 
water pricing in aquifer areas with high-value crops. Establishment of water markets is 
another difficult task, because institutional reforms require major and persistent efforts, 
and because farmers distrust such schemes. 
Augmenting water supply in the Mediterranean coastal areas by publicly financed 
desalination is a much simpler option, but it will mean ensuring that irrigation water is 
not subsidized and the farmers are obliged to pay high desalination costs. Currently, 
farmers are extracting water from aquifers at pumping costs that are lower than 
desalination costs. Thus, it is somewhat unlikely that farmers will not buy desalinated 
water. Public investments in desalination plants can be justified only under a strict 
enforcement of an aquifer overdraft ban by the water authority, which would force 
farmers to buy desalinated water. 
The quality problems faced by the Mediterranean agriculture are illustrated in the 
second example presented here, which deals with nonpoint pollutio n abatement from 
the agricultural sector. This example shows that nonpoint pollution control instruments 
cannot be accurately assessed without a correct understanding of the key underlying 
biophysical processes. Neglect of these processes may lead to adoption of incorrect 
policy measures.       
 
Water Framework Directive and Mediterranean irrigated agriculture 
  
The European Union approved the Water Framework Directive to protect all 
continental, coastal and subsurface waters. The objectives of the Directive are to 
improve water quality and ecosystems conditions, promote sustainable use of water, and 
reduce discharges to water bodies. Water pricing should approximate full recovery costs 
in order to improve water use efficiency, by including extraction, distribution and 
treatment costs, environmental costs and resource value costs. It requires a combination 
of discharge limits and water quality standards, with deadlines to achieve good status 
for all waters. 
The European Water Directive has the potential to solve water scarcity and nonpoint 
pollution in the Mediterranean countries. This initiative is supported by the findings of 
the European Environmental Agency, which point to agricultural nonpoint pollution as 
the primary cause for water quality deterioration in many European watersheds (EEA 
1999 and 2003). However, the reliance of the Directive on water pricing to curb demand 
may fail in the Mediterranean countries such as Spain and Italy, where high irrigation 
demands and quality problems are compounded by water scarcity. 
Water pricing is unlikely to solve scarcity or improve quality in the more degraded 
areas, because rising water prices would reduce consumption in the large irrigation 
districts of inland Spain or southern Italy, based on collective systems and low-value 
crops, where degradation problems are moderate. But water demand will not respond to 
higher prices in areas based on individual aquifer extractions for the Mediterranean 
high-value crops, where pressure on water resources is pervasive and degradation is 
severe (Massarutto 2003).   2
Water pricing will fail as a workable policy for curbing demand for several reasons. 
The first is that, after decades of mismanagement, the number of illegal private wells is 
very high and there is no control over the volumes of water pumped from either legal or 
illegal wells. Consequently, it is almost impossible to implement a tax on water pumped 
from aquifers. A second reason is related to the water price level that is needed to curb 
demand. In Spain, shadow prices of water in coastal areas under greenhouse production 
can reach 3 to 5 €/m3, against 10-20 cents €/m
3 in inland Spain, while current water 
prices in coastal areas are between 6-21 cents €/m3, compared to 2 -5 cents €/m3 in 
inland collective irrigation systems. With urban prices in Spain close to or below 1 
€/m3, and seawater desalination at around 50 cents €/m3, it would seem unacceptable to 
set agricultural prices in water scarcity areas above urban and desalination prices. 
Though a policy designed to control aquifer overdraft would be quite difficult to 
implement, a water pricing policy that would drive prices above the 3-5 €/m3 shadow 
price for private extractions would be impossible to implement, both because of its 
technical and administrative unfeasibility and the daunting prospect of social opposition 
from the farmers. These more degraded areas will require other Directive instruments, 
such as controlling aquifer overdraft by reducing concessions, and enforcing quality 
standards and pollution discharge limits. 
These facts indicate that the Water Framework Directive would be difficult to 
implement in the Mediterranean countries. The issue is the following: water pricing is 
technically (but not politically) feasible at least for the collective irrigation systems 
managed by the basin authorities, but measures to control aquifers extractions are much 
more difficult to implement. The information needed by the policymakers includes rates 
of aquifers recharge and pumping by the farmers, discharges from activities using both 
surface and groundwater, soils, transport and fate processes, pollution to the 
environment, and ecosystem damage costs. This information is not available in 
developed or developing countries with significant irrigated agriculture, and is neither 
available in the Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and 
Turkey. Without this information base, it is impossible to design reasonable control 
measures to prevent aquifer overdraft and reduce nonpoint pollution. The consequence 
will be that water pricing measures suited to reduce industrial and urban demand, which 
are paramount in northern and central European countries, would be implemented for 
irrigation in the Mediterranean countries, instead of the measures that are really needed. 
Even under the now binding Water Framework Directive, policy formulation in 
Spain shows that the traditional approach of increasing water supply remains the main 
option for water policy initiatives. The recent Ebro water transfer project and the new 
AGUA project, highlight the weaknesses of this traditional approach in Spain. 
  
Example of the Ebro transfer 
 
The Ebro interbasin project was intended to solve the acute water quantity and 
quality problems of southeastern Spanish basins. The main argument against the Ebro 
transfer was the need for new policy initiatives based on reasonable management 
measures. A research effort was undertaken (Albiac et al., 2003 and 2006) to evaluate 
alternatives to the Ebro water transfer. In the first alternative, a strategy was analyzed in 
which groundwater overdraft was forbidden, and there were no transfers of water from 
external basins. In the second scenario, a price increase is considered in order to find the 
price level that could balance water demand with the available water resources in the 
Southeastern basins. This scenario follows the full recovery cost principle of the Water 
Framework Directive. The third alternative was to expand water supply with transferred   3
water from the Ebro, linked to water subsidies to m aintain the present low irrigation 
water prices. The fourth alternative combines water trading among counties with 
prohibition of aquifer overdraft. Water trading may take place along present conveying 
facilities of main rivers and canals, allowing for additional supply of desalinated water. 
Desalinated water is considered in coastal counties that exhibit very high shadow prices 
of water. 
The results from each water management alternative are summarized in Table 1. 
Under the present baseline scenario, quasi-rent is above 1,700  million €, which is 
reduced to around 1,400 million € by raising water prices to 0.12 €/m3, and to 1,300 
million € by raising water prices to 0.18 €/m3. Banning groundwater overdraft reduces 
quasi-rent to 1,300 million €. Under the combined alternative, quasi-rent exceeds 1,600 
million € which is larger than under any other demand management measure. The Ebro 
transfer project maintains current quasi-rent of farmers, but requires 300 million € in 
subsidies to keep the low water prices currently charged to farmers. 
 
 
Table 1. Water and quasi-rent scenarios for southeastern basins. 
  Júcar basin  Segura basin  Sur basin  Total Southeast 
Current Water Demand (hm
3)  1,450  863  232  2,545 
Water demand reduction for agricultural use by…         
...banning groundwater overdraft   139  213   70   422 
...increasing 0.12 €/m
3 water prices    313  142   54   509 
...increasing 0.18 €/m
3 water prices    350  181   74   605 
...combined alternative (overdraft ban, water 
   markets, desalination)   139   213   10   362 
Current Quasi-rent (million €)  586  536  589  1,711 
Quasi-rent losses to farmers by...         
... banning groundwater overdraft   46  101  261  408 
... increasing 0.12 €/m
3 water prices    166   94   27  287 
... increasing 0.18 €/m
3 water prices  232  136   37  405 
... combined alternative (overdraft ban, water 
    markets, desalination)  39  49  -5   83 
Subsidies needed for the Ebro Project…         
… to cover gap between costs of transferred water 
(0.20 to 1.05 €/m
3) and  present low water prices  
54  187  60  301 
 
A sharp reduction in water demand is achieved by raising irriga tion water prices in 
the range 0.12-0.18 €/m3. The current annual 2,550 hm3 of water demand for irrigation 
falls by 500-600 hm 3, but the costs to farmers in quasi-rent losses are also quite high in 
the range 300-400 million €. Prohibition of groundwater overdraft is the worst solution 
because the fall in annual water demand is only 400 hm3, considerably below the 
reduction achieved by raising prices, whereas costs to farmers are higher than under the 
water pricing alternatives. The combined alternative of b anning overdraft, water 
markets and desalination, reduces the annual irrigation demand by almost 400 hm3 at a 
much lower cost, less than 100 million € in terms of farmers’ quasi-rent. The combined 
alternative also secures an end to aquifer overdraft. 
This combined alternative of banning groundwater overdraft, allowing water 
markets among counties and expanding water supply by seawater desalination, is a very 
good alternative that improves with any other demand management measure and is 
superior to the Ebro transfer project that the former Spanish government was planning 
to implement.   4
Some caveats should be made on the difficulties of implementing demand 
management measures. Decades of water resources mismanagement in the southeastern 
basins of the Iberian Peninsula have created pervasive pressures on both water quantity 
and quality. The measure of banning aquifer overdraft is very difficult to implement 
since there is currently no effective control on the number of wells or the volumes of 
abstractions. 
Water pricing measures are also difficult to implement for the following reasons: i) 
farmers will oppose price increases; ii) basin authorities could increase the water prices 
charged to collective irrigation systems with surface water, but they have no control on 
costs incurred by individual farmers for pumping from the aquifers; iii) even if water 
pricing could be implemented for individual abstractions, raising water prices will not 
reduce demand in irrigated areas, based on greenhouse production with very profitable 
crops. The example is the shadow price of water in Campo Dalías, where prices should 
escalate above 3 €/m
3 from current 0.21 €/m3, in order to curb demand. 
Establishment of water markets is also a difficult task. Although there are informal 
water transactions, the possibility of formal water markets introduced by the 1999 
reform of the water law, has not spurred any significant trades during the last five years. 
The reason is that farmers distrust formal water markets.  
Augmenting water supply by desalination with public financing is a much simpler 
option, but the problem is the effective irrigation demand if water is not subsidized and 
farmers face the high cost of desalinated water. The potential for desalination can be 
seen by its effective demand, which reaches almost 400 hm3 per year in coastal counties 
of the area. Currently, farmers are extracting water from aquifers at pumping costs 
around 0.09-0.18 cents €/m
3. Since pumping costs are considerably lower than 
desalination, farmers will not buy desalinated water. The public investments is 
desalination plants are only reasonable under a strict enforcement by the water authority 
of aquifer overdraft prohibition, that would force farmers to buy desalinated water. 
This last point summarizes the problem faced by the new AGUA project that is 
supposed to substitute the Ebro transfer. The AGUA project includes investments of 
1,200 million € to build a desalination capacity of 600 hm 3, with around 300 hm3 for 
irrigation in coastal counties. As indicated above, there is an hypothetical effective 
demand in these counties amounting to 400 hm
3, but implementation of the AGUA 
project requires the strict control of aquifer overdraft, and this will be a daunting 
challenge for the water authority. The risk of the AGUA project is that public funds will 
be invested in desalination plants, but the irrigation demands may not materialize. 
 
Example of agricultural nonpoint pollution control 
  
Agricultural nonpoint pollution is a complex issue requiring information on 
pollution emissions at the source, transport and fate of the pollutants, ambient pollution 
loads and their damage costs. Moreover, the physical, economic and social dimensions 
of the problem are such that they require multi-disciplinary and multi-scale approaches. 
In the case of Spain, nonpoint pollution is addressed at present by both domestic and 
European agricultural and environmental policies. The main current policies are the 
domestic National Hydrological Plan and National Irrigation Plan, and the European 
Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, Water Framework Directive and Nitrates 
Directive. The consistency of these policie s to abate pollution is far from evident and 
difficult to assess. An example of their inconsistency is the nonpoint pollution impact of 
higher water prices advocated by the Water Directive, which is discussed below. 
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The information presented here comes from the study by  Martínez and Albiac 
(2004). These authors indicate that their results are limited and do not cover the whole 
range of factors affecting agricultural nonpoint pollution. The CAP reform of 2003 and 
further trade liberalization by the EU will  change land use patterns for irrigated 
agriculture. Both abandonment and a more intensive use of irrigated land are expected, 
depending basically on the availability of human and capital resources in agricultural 
regions. More intensive irrigated agriculture is likely in the Mediterranean coastal areas 
of Spain, while inland collective irrigation areas are expected to stagnate. Another 
limitation relates to the range of pollution instruments considered. This is the case of 
wetland creation or recovery, whic h is an efficient instrument for large nitrogen 
abatement reductions (Ribaudo el al. 2001). 
Among the different nonpoint pollution issues, the present discussion focuses on the 
appropriate base instrument for nitrogen pollution abatement, which requires 
information on the underlying biophysical processes. This is a key question for the 
design of policy measures, and, in particular, for the design of the Programme of 
Measures of the Water Directive. The acute scarcity of information for the 
Mediterranean agriculture, on the biophysical processes involved in pollution and the 
associated damage costs, means that measures cannot be reliably assessed.  
Evaluation of the efficiency of alternative nitrogen abatement measures requires the 
consideration of biophysical aspects linked to the dynamics of nitrogen in the soil, 
including crop type and soil class. The effects of selected abatement measures were 
examined through a dynamic model, which included six crops and one representative 
soil, in the Flumen-Monegros irrigation district located in the Ebro basin of Spain. 
Ranking the nitrogen control instruments by their cost efficiency contributed to the 
information needed in the policy decision process. The results obtained agree with 
previous literature, and indicate that a fertilizer standard is the second best efficient 
measure to control nitrogen pollution (Table 2). 
 


















Base Scenario  22.3  24.1  190.7  4,525  66.1  1,459 
0.06 €/m
3  21.2  18.8    86.4  4,367  43.3  1,381  Water 
price  0.09 €/m
3  19.6  12.6  109.1  4,039  20.2  1,346 
0.90 €/kg  22.4  22.6  200.6  4,265  45.3  1,222  Nitrogen 
price  1.20 €/kg  22.7  21.5  186.6  3,976  56.2    990 
Nitrogen standard  23.7  23.8    98.1  4,134  14.1    634 
Emission tax  23.9  23.8  185.4  3,596  43.4    697 
 
 
Several measures to reduce emissions were simulated and compared to the present 
baseline scenario. An increase in water prices only slightly reduced nitrogen discharges 
at very high costs to farmers and society. A tax in the use of nitrogen fertilizer resulted 
in more significant pollution reduction at much lower c osts. A limit on nitrogen 
application curbed emissions by more than half, with a very moderate impact on quasi-
rent and gains in welfare. The introduction of subsidies linked to the standard could be a 
good second best instrument to achieve nitrogen pollution control. 
The finding that higher water prices are very inefficient to abate discharges, 
questions the reliance of the European Water Framework Directive on water pricing as a 
pollution control instrument to reach the “good status” target for all water sources. The 
implication is that other instruments included in the Directive, such as ambient quality 
standards and discharge limits, need to be applied in order to curb pollution. Looking at   6
the Spanish domestic policies, the main piece of legislation affecting nonpoint pollution 
is the National Irrigation Plan, which promotes irrigation modernization through public 
subsidies. Although yields increase and pollution is reduced substantially by renovating 
secondary canals and plot irrigation systems, the problem is that the required 
investments are not financially sustainable, even when public subsidies are accounted 
for (Uku 2003). Accordingly, nitrogen pollution can be controlled by the abatement 
measures examined here, but not by the National Irrigation Plan legislation. 
Additionally, the results obtained provide further evidence to the discussion on the 
choice of the appropriate policy instrument for nitrogen control. Horan and Shortle 
(2001), using the empirical results by Helfand and House (1995) and Larson et al. 
(1996), state that instruments based on irrigation water are more cost-efficient than 
instruments based on the use of nitrogen fertilizer. The reason given is that irrigation 
water is more highly correlated with nitrate leaching, implying that the appropriate 
instrument base is not the nutrient responsible for pollution but rather the input most 
highly correlated with pollution. This interpretation appears inaccurate, because the 
dynamics of nitrogen in the soil are ignored. Neglect of the dynamic aspects of nonpoint 
pollution may have serious consequences for the design of effective policy measures. 
An important question for the choice of the correct pollution control instrument is 
the implementation costs of the instruments. Measures that seem suitable may be 
associated with implementation difficulties relating to their political and social 
acceptability or transaction costs, and thus the trade-off between cost-efficiency and 




The Mediterranean countries have a large water demand for irrigation, which creates 
significant water quality problems compounded by water scarcity. The heated policy 
debate that has been taking place in Spain to overcome water scarcity and resource 
degradation, highlights the difficulties of achieving sustainable water resources 
management, because of the conflicting interests of diverse stakeholders, including 
regions, economic sectors, and political and environmental groups. 
Two distinct general policy approaches for dealing with water quantity and quality 
problems in the Mediterranean are the traditional approach of expanding water supply 
and the newly emerging water demand management initiatives. Examples of the 
traditional approach are inter-basin transfers and seawater desalination. The newly 
emerging initiatives rely on measures such as water pricing, revision of water rights, 
abstraction limits on surface and subsurface waters, development of regulated water 
markets, water resources reuse and recycling, and targeted subsidies to upgrade 
irrigation systems. 
The effects of these measures on water quality is difficult to ascertain. It seems that 
expanding water supply may have negative effects on nonpoint agricultural pollution, 
because it favours the expansion of irrigation in Mediterranean coastal agriculture for 
high value crops that can pay for this additional water supply. Upgrading irrigation 
systems tend to reduce river flows with a negative impact in the water quality. In order 
to avoid this, public subsidies to irrigation upgrading have to be coupled with cutbacks 
in concession volumes to irrigation districts.    
Several water quantity and quality issues in Mediterranean irrigated agriculture have 
been examined by presenting empirical evidence f rom Spain on alternative policy 
options and measures. The measures examined cover two cases: the evaluation of   7
alternatives to solve water scarcity in the basins of southeastern Spain, and ranking 
agricultural pollution control instruments by their cost efficiency. 
The first case is the recent Ebro transfer project and the new AGUA project 
designed to substitute for this transfer. Both projects are illustrative examples that 
highlight the failure of approaches based on expanding water supply. Results from 
analyzing the Ebro transfer show that a combined alternative of banning aquifer 
overdraft, water trading and a small volume of desalination, is by far a better alternative 
than building the Ebro transfer. This combined alternative reduces farmers’ quasi-rent 
by a smaller amount than the subsidies required by the Ebro project.     
Augmenting water supply by publicly financed desalination is politically appealing 
for the new Spanish government after cancelling the Ebro transfer, and its AGUA 
project seems to be an appropriate alternative. However, the problem with the AGUA 
project is finding the effective irrigation demand, especially when water is not 
subsidized, because farmers will face high costs for desalinated water. Farmers are 
extracting water from aquifers at pumping costs considerably below that of desalination, 
and they will avoid buying desalinated water. Only a strict enforcement by the water 
authority to prohibit aquifer overdraft would force farmers to buy desalinated water. 
This is a daunting challenge for the water authority, and the risk of the AGUA project is 
that public funds may be invested in desalination plants, but then the irrigation demand 
may not materialize. 
The second case examined compares several measures to abate agricultural nonpoint 
pollution. Selecting the right policy measure requires knowledge of the underlying 
biophysical processes involved in pollution and the associated damage costs to the 
aquatic ecosystems. Ranking nitrogen control instruments by their cost-efficiency 
shows that a fertilizer standard is a good abatement measure. In contrast, rising water 
prices is very inefficient and this finding questions the reliance of the Water Framework 
Directive on water pricing as a pollution control instrument. 
The empirical findings presented here indicate that water pricing does not appear to 
be an efficient measure for solving water quantity and quality problems for the issues 
discussed. Nevertheless, some minimum price of water is required to make farmers 
understand that water is not a free good. The Spanish example shows water pricing to 
be ineffective not only as a means to reduce water demand in coastal areas with high-
value crops and severe pollution problems, but also as a pollution abatement instrument 
for inland areas with low value crops. The introduction of water rights and markets 
appears more reasonable than trying to allocate water through water pricing. However, 
the development of water markets is not easy, since institutional reforms require 
enormous and persistent efforts. 
One issue deserving special attention is the acute lack of knowledge that exists in 
the Mediterranean European countries regarding aquifer dynamics, pollution loads in 
surface and subsurface waters, soils, transport processes and fate of pollutants, ambient 
pollution, and economic valuation of damage costs to aquatic ecosystems. This lack of 
knowledge precludes the design of reasonable policy measures to solve water quantity 
and quality problems in the Mediterranean countries. The consequence is that the 
popular water pricing measures suited to reduce industrial and urban demand in 
northern and central European countries is likely to be implemented for irrigation in the 
Mediterranean countries instead of the measures that are really needed. 
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